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NOTE
DEFECTIVE INFORMATION: SHOULD
INFORMATION BE A "PRODUCT" SUBJECT
TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS?
Joseph L. Reutiman*
Numerous consumer goods, including books, computer software,
and commercial GPS devices, contain a significant informational com-
ponent. How should the law respond when the information contained in
such products is inaccurate and causes personal injury? In the products
liability arena, courts have traditionally been hostile to such claims and
have barred recovery on the basis that information is not a "product"
because of its intangible nature.
This tangibility test has outlived its usefulness. The cases applying
this test have twisted the definition of product beyond recognition. Fur-
thermore, as technology progresses, consumers are increasingly exposed
to products containing potentially defective information that do not
neatly fit within the tangible-intangible paradigm.
This Note calls upon courts to treat information as a product and
utilize the concept of duty as a means for controlling the extent of infor-
mation-related liability. This duty-based approach is flexible enough to
reconcile the concerns surrounding liability for defective information
with the policy goals of the products liability system.
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INTRODUCTION
The widespread adoption of products liability has fundamentally al-
tered American tort law.' In delineating the boundaries of this system,
courts have struggled with the question of what constitutes a "product"
for purposes of products liability.2 One problematic sub-issue in this
area is whether information constitutes a product and, if so, whether mar-
keting "defective" 3 information exposes providers of information to
products liability claims. Many of the courts that have addressed this
issue have answered it in the negative, reasoning that information cannot
be a product because of its intangible nature.4 Yet, these courts have not
been entirely consistent in applying this tangible-intangible distinction.
For example, when confronted with the difficult line-drawing problems
this approach creates, several courts have held that the information dis-
played in some physical media (e.g., aeronautical charts) is a product.5
In actuality, these courts are grappling (with varying degrees of self-
awareness) with the problem of how to promote the policy goals of prod-
ucts liability while still maintaining the free flow of information. Fearful
of the deleterious effect products liability claims could potentially have
on the "free market of ideas," these courts have struggled to find a theo-
retical distinction between information and other types of consumer
I See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966) (describing the history of products liability in American tort law
and the system's theoretical basis); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Un-
easy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1437 (2010) (arguing that the policy
rationales supporting products liability are weak for a variety of products).
2 See Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term "Product" Under Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKI.A. L. REV. 635 (1991).
3 The term "defective" as applied to marketed information means, for purposes of this
Note, information that is inaccurate or misleading. The issue addressed in this Note should not
be confused with failure-to-warn actions, which are sometimes labeled as "informational de-
fect" claims.
4 See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (apply-
ing California law); Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 325 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (applying Florida law); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1278
(D. Colo. 2002) (applying Colorado law); Way v. Boy Scouts of Am., 856 S.W.2d 230, 239
(Tex. App. 1993).
5 Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying California
law); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying Colorado
law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying
Nevada law); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71-72 (1985).
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goods. In doing so, they have placed undue emphasis on the definition
of product.
This Note asks courts to cease approaching this problem from the
perspective of whether or not certain forms of defective information are
products because this approach has led to incoherent and untenable re-
sults. Instead, courts should treat information incorporated into physical
media as part of the product and apply a duty-based analysis to limit the
scope of liability for defective information. This approach is more con-
ceptually elegant and allows courts greater control in shaping the extent
of liability in situations involving defective information. Not only will
this approach result in more consistent results, it will also advance the
policy goals of products liability by ensuring a beneficial risk allocation
while avoiding undue interference into the free market of ideas. Since
this approach incorporates existing products liability principles, it does
not represent a major doctrinal shift but instead requires courts to pro-
ceed in the same manner as they would in ordinary products liability
litigation.
Part I of this Note introduces the theoretical background of products
liability law in the United States and discusses the policy goals this sys-
tem hopes to achieve. Part II describes the development of the tangi-
ble-intangible distinction for determining whether information is treated
as a product for purposes of products liability and illustrates how courts
have not been entirely true to the logic of this test in the contexts of
printed material, aeronautical charts, and electronic devices. Finally,
Part III argues that this issue can be satisfactorily resolved by presuming
marketed information is a product with courts applying ordinary tort law
duty principles. Because allegedly defective information implicates vari-
ous special concerns, public policy considerations will generally compel
active pretrial policing of claims under the concept of duty and result in a
finding of no liability as a matter of law.6
I. THE POLICY GOALS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Public policy considerations have driven the widespread adoption of
liability in tort for product-caused harm. Beyond recognition of products
liability as a distinct field of tort, public policy has also played a signifi-
cant role in determining how far liability under this system should ex-
tend. Therefore, in assessing whether information should be considered
a product, it is necessary to understand the policy goals of products
liability.
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND) EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7 (2010).
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In his concurrence in Escola v. Coco-Cola Bottling Co., Justice
Roger Traynor gave one of the earliest expositions of the policy goals
behind the imposition of strict liability for defective products.7 Unsatis-
fied with the efficacy of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in the context of
product-caused personal injury as a means for enabling a plaintiff to
show defect via circumstantial proof, Justice Traynor suggested that
product manufacturers should instead be held strictly liable for the harm
caused by the goods they release into the marketplace.8 Justice Traynor
articulated several policy justifications for the imposition of strict liabil-
ity that later courts have found compelling. 9
First, Justice Traynor argued that "public policy demands that re-
sponsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards
to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market."' 0
Second, he noted that losses falling on a single individual can be devas-
tating and that the imposition of strict liability would have a significant
insurance effect by preventing the additional costs that occur when one
person alone bears the burden of an accident." The premiums of this
insurance would be "distributed among the public as a cost of doing busi-
ness."12 Third, he argued that since there is a persistent risk of even non-
negligently caused defects, there should be "general and constant protec-
tion and the manufacturer is best suited to afford such protection."' 3
Although Justice Traynor ultimately persuaded the California Su-
preme Court to adopt strict products liability because of these policy con-
siderations,14 his analysis remains unsatisfactory with regard to several
of the justifications presented in his Escola concurrence. First, it is not
immediately apparent that shifting from negligence-based liability to
strict liability will compel manufacturers to invest in additional resources
necessary to prevent defective products from reaching the market. Under
a negligence scheme, manufacturers will theoretically allocate resources
to prevent those defects that are worth preventing; in effect, they will
invest in care up to the point at which they can no longer be found liable
7 See 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944).
8 See id. at 441.
9 See, e.g., Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Williams, 234 So. 2d 620, 623-24 (Miss. 1970);
Miller v. Preitz, 221 A.2d 320, 334 (Pa. 1966) (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
10 Escola, 150 P.2d at 440.
11 See id. at 441.
12 Id.
'3 Id.
14 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). The
Greenman decision had a significant influence on the formulation and widespread adoption of
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. At the time § 402A was written, Greenman was
the only decision imposing strict liability for defect-caused harm. See David A. Logan, When
the Restatement is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the "Flagrant Trespasser," 37
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1448, 1457 (2011).
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for negligence.15 Under a negligence-based system, the costs of acci-
dents that are not worth preventing-so-called residual accident costs-
will be borne by the individuals upon whom such costs fall.t 6 Theoreti-
cally, a manufacturer's investment decision will not change under a strict
liability system-a rational manufacturer will still invest in care up to the
same point as in a negligence-based system, i.e., to the point where the
savings in accident costs justifies the marginal expenditure in safety, be-
cause it will be cheaper for the manufacturer to simply pay additional
accident costs than to invest in more care.17 The difference between the
two systems is that the manufacturer, rather than the consumer, will bear
the residual accident costs under a strict liability system.' 8 Therefore,
Justice Traynor's claim that moving to a strict liability system will in-
crease product safety is questionable.
Second, because strict liability does not increase overall product
safety, Justice Traynor's assertion that a manufacturer is in the best posi-
tion to protect consumers from even non-negligently-caused defects is
troublesome. Once a product causes injury to a consumer, there is noth-
ing left for the manufacturer to protect the consumer against-the dam-
age has been realized and the issue becomes who should bear the
ultimate costs of the accident.' 9
Justice Traynor's final policy concern, however, provides a strong
justification for the imposition of strict liability because strict liability
can theoretically provide an effective insurance system for defect-caused
harm. 20 Under this system, the manufacturers held liable for residual
accident costs function as insurers of product users harmed by defects. 2 1
This insurance system is viable because the risks insured against are as-
certainable ahead of time and it effectively avoids the problems of ad-
verse selection and moral hazard. 2 2 Since insurance is tied to each
product sold, individual purchasers cannot decide whether they want in-
surance coverage or not. 2 3 This means that although the risk of loss
might differ between two product users, low-risk individuals are not able
I5 See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INIRODUCIION ro LAW ANI) ECONOMICS
99-100 (2d ed. 1989).
16 See THOMAS J. MicEii, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 45 (2d ed. 2009).
17 Id. at 44.
18 Id.
19 See JAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODucTs LIABIILITY:
PROutuEMS AND PROCESS 25 (7th ed. 2011).
20 See generally Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bau J. ECON. 120
(1982) (examining the effect of liability rules, including negligence and strict liability, on
insurance incentives in first- and third-party insurance policies).
21 See MICEI, supra note 16, at 44.
22 See George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO Sr. L.J. 497, 500-01 (1987).
23 See id. at 502.
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to leave the pool 2 4 and cause the entire pool to unravel. 25 Furthermore,
because the defect must have existed at the time the product entered into
the marketplace and recovery in most jurisdictions in situations of prod-
uct misuse is restricted by principles of comparative fault, individuals
have a limited ability to alter risk levels post-distribution. 26
Beyond Justice Traynor's insight, a strict liability system has the
ability to affect consumption levels. 2 7 Since the insurance imposed
through strict liability will often be passed on to consumers in the form
of higher prices, in theory, aggregate demand should decrease and the
total amount of product-caused harm will decrease accordingly. 28 Fur-
thermore, strict liability also has a significant process effect: it reduces
transaction costs by simplifying the proof necessary for an individual to
recover on a claim. 29 Liability without fault decreases the costs associ-
ated with proving negligence and helps speed up the adjudication of
claims.30
Given these underlying policy concerns, any proposal to alter the
products liability system-especially the threshold issue of what prod-
ucts are included-must consider the impact such an alteration would
have on achieving the system's policy goals. Contrary to intuition, broad
liability without fault will not compel manufacturers to invest more re-
sources in making their products safer.3 ' The real benefits of the product
liability system arise through the reduction of transaction costs associ-
ated with prosecuting claims as well as imposing a viable insurance
effect.32
II. THRESHOLD ISSUES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY & THE RISE OF THE
TANGIBLE-INTANGIBLE DISTINCTION
The advent of strict liability for the manufacture and distribution of
defective products has created significant threshold issues regarding
24 However, consumers may, of course, choose not to purchase the product at all.
25 See Priest, supra note 22, at 501-02.
26 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & EcONomics 358 (3d ed. 2000) ("The
conclusion we draw is that strict liability with the defense of assumption of the risk and prod-
uct misuse is an efficient standard for minimizing the social costs of product-related injuries.
The absence of these defenses compels manufacturers to offer insurance with their product,
probably an inefficient outcome.").
27 See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products
Liability, 69 CALuF. L. REv. 919 (1981).
28 See id. at 933.
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 See MICHAEL 1. KRAUSS, PRINCIPLES OlF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 35, 271-76 (2010).
32 However, as a matter of public policy, most courts have held that while the products
liability system imposes a beneficial insurance effect, manufacturers and distributors should
not be treated as general insurers of their products and the concept of defect should serve as a
limiting principle for liability. See infra Part III.
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which claims are, and which are not, included in the products liability
system.33 These issues are incredibility important to litigants, as they
may ultimately prove dispositive of a particular claim. For example, a
plaintiff whose claim falls outside the boundaries of the products liability
system is generally denied the benefit of strict liability and must instead
prove fault under a negligence theory or attempt to show the breach of an
express or implied warranty. 34 Proving negligence can be an impossible
proposition in certain cases where evidence has been destroyed because
of the product defect itself or misfeasance on the part of the defendant
and can potentially result in the complete denial of recovery.35 Further-
more, sophisticated liability-conscious manufacturers and distributors are
wary of providing statements with their products that could be construed
as creating an express warranty.
One significant threshold issue in this area is what constitutes a
product for purposes of products liability. 36 Although a few jurisdictions
have chosen to legislatively define the term product,37 most have instead
relied on courts to handle the issue.38 In approaching this problem, the
second and third Restatement of Torts provide a useful starting point.
While the Restatement (Second) of Torts failed to provide a concrete def-
inition,39 the Restatement (Third) of Torts takes the position that a prod-
33 See KRAuss, supra note 31, at 30-39.
34 See id. at 40-51 (discussing negligence and warranty as alternate theories of liability).
35 See generally Sheldon M. Finkelstein, Evelyn R. Storch & James Simpson, Spoliation,
or Please Don't Leave the Cake Out in the Rain, 32 LrriiG. 28 (2006) (discussing the judicial
response to spoliation in civil litigation).
36 See KRAUSS, supra note 31, at 30-39.
37 See, e.g., IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 6-1402(3) (2008) (defining a product as "any object
possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assembled whole or as a component
part or parts, and produced for introduction into trade or commerce. Human tissue and organs,
including human blood and its components, are excluded from this term."); Mo. COonE ANN.
Crs. & Juo. PROC. § 5-1l5(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2006) (defining a product as "a tangible article,
including attachments, accessories, and component parts, and accompanying labels, warnings,
instructions, and packaging."); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 7.72.010(3) (West 2010) (defining a
product as "any object possessing intrinsic value ... produced for introduction into trade or
commerce.").
38 See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991) (reason-
ing that the inherently physical nature of the items supports the notion that products must be
tangible).
39 See REsrATEMENT (SecoND) on Tours § 402A (1965). To the extent the Restatement
(Second) of Torts addresses the issue, comment d to section 402A states:
The rule stated in this Section is not limited to the sale of food for human consump-
tion, or other products for intimate bodily use, although it will obviously include
them. It extends to any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same
condition, in which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer. Thus the
rule stated applies to an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a water
heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a chair, and an insecticide. It
applies also to products which, if they are defective, may be expected to and do
cause only "physical harm" in the form damage to the user's land or chattels, as in
the case of animal food or a herbicide.
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uct is "tangible personal property." 4 0 While this definition is adequate
for the vast majority of situations, it can pose difficult conceptual
problems when applied to marketed information; in particular, there is
the issue of whether information found in admittedly tangible forms of
physical media should be considered separately the rest of the product. 4 1
Most courts addressing the issue have been willing to consider informa-
tion as separate from the physical media in which it is contained. 42
A. Aeronautical Charts
Early decisions grappling with the issue of information as a product
embraced the notion that information found within aeronautical charts is
a product for purposes of products liability. 43 While these opinions agree
that aeronautical charts are products, the policy implications underlying
this result are often obscured or inadequately addressed.
In Aetna Casualty and Surety v. Jeppesen & Co., a Bonanza Air-
lines airplane crashed while approaching Las Vegas, Nevada, killing all
passengers on board.44 The pilot of the aircraft relied on a Jeppesen in-
strument approach chart graphically depicting "all pertinent aspects of
the approach such as directional headings, distances, minimum altitudes,
turns, radio frequencies and procedures to be followed if an approach is
missed." 45 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the first appellate
court to squarely address this issue, explicitly rejected the defendant's
contention that the approach chart did not constitute a product, noting:
Jeppesen acquires [FAA approach data] and portrays the
information therein on a graphic approach chart. This is
Jeppesen's "product." ....
While the information conveyed in words and figures on
the Las Vegas approach chart was completely correct,
Id. at cmt. d.
40 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucis LIABuIrTy § 19 (1998). Comment d
of this section further explains:
Although a tangible medium such as a book, itself clearly a product, delivers the
information, the plaintiffs grievance in such cases is with the information, not with
the tangible medium. Most courts, expressing concern that imposing strict liability
for the dissemination of false and defective information would significantly impinge
on free speech have, appropriately, refused to impose strict products liability in these
cases.
Id. at cmt. d.
41 See infra Part I.B.
42 See id.
43 See, e.g., Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying
Colorado law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1981)
(applying Nevada law).
44 See Aetna, 642 F.2d at 341.
45 Id. at 341-42.
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the purpose of the chart was to translate this information
into an instantly understandable graphic
representation . . . .
The trial judge found that the Las Vegas chart "radically
departed" from the usual representation of graphics in
the other Jeppesen charts; that the conflict between the
information conveyed by words and numbers and the in-
formation conveyed by graphics rendered the chart un-
reasonably dangerous and a defective product.4 6
The court's conclusion in this case is striking for several reasons.
First, the court's decision is entirely devoid of any explanation for hold-
ing that the Jeppesen's chart constitutes a product-the court simply
posits this as fact.47 Second, the court concedes that the information in
the instrument approach chart was factually accurate. 4 8 Instead of basing
liability on the accuracy of the information in the chart, however, the
court found a defect solely because the chart presented information in a
misleading manner; in effect, the court allowed liability on the basis of
defective design. 49 This decision remains anomalous. Other courts have
refrained from applying concepts of design defect to situations involving
defective information.50
Two years later, in Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit also found aeronautical charts to be prod-
ucts.51  At issue in Saloomey was a Jeppesen area chart52 that
erroneously indicated that the Martinsburg, West Virginia airport was
equipped with a full instrument landings system. 53 In finding the misla-
beled chart to be a defective product, the court reasoned that
[b]y publishing and selling the charts, Jeppesen under-
took a special responsibility, as seller, to insure that con-
sumers will not be injured by the use of the charts;
Jeppesen is entitled-and encouraged-to treat the bur-
46 Id. at 342.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See Robert B. Schultz, Application of Strict Product Liability to Aeronautical Chart
Publishers, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 431, 436 (1999); see also Aetna, 642 F.2d at 343 (noting that
"a plaintiff can recover for injuries caused by use of a product with a defective design which
makes it unsafe for its intended use, so long as the plaintiff is unaware of the defect at the time
of use.").
50 See, e.g., Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002).
51 See Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983).
52 An area chart is an aeronautical chart that portrays the geographical features around
metropolitan areas and their correlative airways. See id. at 672.
53 See id. at 672-73.
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den of accidental injury as a cost of production to be
covered by liability insurance. . . .
Appellant's position that its navigational charts provide
no more than a service ignores the mass-production as-
pect of the charts . . . . [T]he mass production and mar-
keting of these charts requires Jeppesen to bear the costs
of accidents that are proximately caused by defects in the
charts. 54
While the court correctly recognized the insurance rationale under-
lying the imposition of liability, this alone does not provide an adequate
explanation for why information represented in the form of an aeronauti-
cal chart should be considered a product. For example, as the appellant
in Saloomey argued, courts have consistently attempted to draw a line
between products and services.55 Courts have refused to hear products
liability claims for services despite the argument that the insurance ratio-
nale behind the imposition of strict liability is no less compelling in situ-
ations involving services. 56 The fact that certain costs can be shifted to
another party cannot alone serve as the defining characteristic for what is
or is not a product.
Furthermore, the court's focus on the concept of mass production is
problematic as well.5 7 Neither the quantity of production nor the mass
marketing of a particular item is the defining characteristic of a prod-
uct.5 8 A particular consumer good should not cease to be a product for
purposes of products liability simply because it is custom-made for a
particular consumer or because it is not produced in mass quantities and
widely distributed to numerous markets.59 By focusing on the fact that
the charts were mass-produced, the court ignored the true issue raised by
the case: how to craft a workable definition of product that will include a
case such as this because the court believes that public policy demands
that printers of aeronautical charts compensate those who reasonably rely
54 Id. at 676-77.
55 See id. at 676; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRonuers LlABIUrrY § 19(b)
(1998) ("Services, even when provided commercially, are not products.").
56 See Schultz, supra note 49, at 439.
57 See Andrew T. Bayman, Note, Strict Liability for Defective Ideas in Publications, 42
VAND. L. REV. 557, 573 (1989) (arguing that the court's emphasis on mass production would
just as easily apply to books and magazines).
58 However, these factors are properly considered with regard to another threshold ques-
tion in products liability: whether the seller of the product is "[o]ne engaged in the business of
selling or otherwise distributing products." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRoDucrs
LIABILITY § I cmt. c (1998).
59 See, e.g., Sprung v. MTR Ravenburg, Inc., 788 N.E.2d 620, 624 (N.Y. 2003) (finding
a defendant sheet metal manufacturer liable for a defective retractable floor despite the fact
that the manufacturer had only produced one such floor).
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on erroneous information contained within their products when such reli-
ance ultimately results in the death of the user.
B. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons
Despite early recognition that aeronautical charts are products, in
Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
shifted away from the notion that information can constitute a product. 60
In Winter, the plaintiffs purchased a copy of The Encyclopedia of Mush-
rooms, a reference guide containing information on the habitat, collec-
tion, and cooking of mushrooms. 61 The plaintiffs subsequently became
seriously ill after ingesting several mushrooms that the guide indicated
were safe to eat and sued the defendant publisher under strict products
liability.62
The Ninth Circuit grappled with the issue of whether the inaccurate
information regarding poisonous mushrooms could be considered a de-
fective product and thereby sustain the plaintiffs' products liability
claim.63 The court began its analysis by positing a distinction between
tangible and intangible items that would become the dominant justifica-
tion for treating commercially sold information as outside the products
liability system:
A book containing Shakespeare's sonnets consists of
two parts, the material and print therein, and the ideas
and expression thereof. The first may be a product, but
the second is not. The latter, were Shakespeare alive,
would be governed by copyright laws; the laws of libel,
to the extent consistent with the First Amendment; and
the laws of misrepresentation, negligence, and mistake.
These doctrines applicable to the second part are aimed
at the delicate issues that arise with respect to intangibles
such as ideas and expression. Products liability law is
geared to the tangible world.M
While recognizing that the physical book was a product, the court never-
theless refused to allow liability for personal injury resulting from any
inaccurate or misleading information contained within the book.65
In reaching this conclusion, the court faced the plaintiffs' contention
that the printed information in The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms is not
conceptually different from the instrument approach data found in aero-
60 See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991).
61 See id. at 1034.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 See id. at 1036.
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nautical charts because both items contain representations of natural fea-
tures and both are intended for use during a hazardous activity. 66
Surprisingly, the court attempted to distinguish the information found in
aeronautical charts from information found in books such as The Ency-
clopedia of Mushrooms:
Aeronautical charts are highly technical tools. They are
graphic depictions of technical, mechanical data. The
best analogy to an aeronautical chart is a compass. Both
may be used to guide an individual who is engaged in an
activity requiring certain knowledge of natural features.
Computer software that fails to yield the result for which
it was designed may be another. In contrast, The Ency-
clopedia of Mushrooms is like a book on how to use a
compass or an aeronautical chart. The chart itself is like
a physical "product" while the "How to Use" book is
pure thought and expression. 67
However, in making this assertion, the court undermined the tangi-
ble-intangible distinction that it had previously established.68 Technical
data published in physical media is just as intangible as non-technical
information-both aeronautical charts and books are physical media con-
taining intangible information. Adding a "highly technical" exception to
the tangible-intangible distinction introduces difficult line-drawing
problems to what the court suggested would be a bright-line test.6 9
The court's analogy between an aeronautical chart and a compass is
also unpersuasive. 70 The plaintiffs in Winter relied on the encyclopedia
as guide to various immutable characteristics of the natural world in the
same manner they would a chart or compass. 7' While the court asserts
that the encyclopedia is merely a "How to Use" guide for the collection
and preparation of mushrooms, 72 it is difficult to see how the instrument
approach charts at issue in Aetna are not similarly "How to Use" guides
for operating an aircraft during a particular landing approach. In fact, the
court in Aetna noted that the charts at issue expressly provided "proce-
dures to be followed if an approach is missed," thereby making them
even more similar to a "How to Use" guide in terms of function.73
66 See id. at 1035-36.
67 Id. at 1036 (emphasis in original).
68 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
69 See Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035.
70 See Schultz, supra note 49, at 446 (criticizing the Winter court's analogy).
71 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
73 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1981).
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The true motivation for the court's holding that the informational
content of The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms is not a product becomes
apparent in the court's discussion of the competing policy goals at play
in this situation. 74 While recognizing that spreading the costs of injuries
is a desirable policy, the court asserted:
[t]he threat of liability without fault (financial responsi-
bility for our words and ideas in the absence of fault or a
special undertaking or responsibility) could seriously in-
hibit those who wish to share thoughts and theories ....
Strict liability principles even when applied to products
are not without their costs. Innovation may be inhibited.
We tolerate these losses. They are much less disturbing
than the prospect that we might be deprived of the latest
ideas and theories.75
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit believed that maintaining the free market of
ideas overcomes the policy goals of the products liability system.
Despite the court's recognition of these competing policy interests,
however, its reasoning remains unsatisfying. First, it is difficult to see
how the free exchange of ideas is threatened by liability for erroneous
printing information with regard to poisonous mushrooms but not aero-
nautical charts. As the plaintiffs pointed out,7 6 both forms of information
attempted to describe characteristics of the natural world. Furthermore,
the value of both products to a consumer depends on the accuracy of the
information provided.77 The court, therefore, elevated one type of infor-
mation above the other without sufficiently distinguishing the two.
Second, the court's assertion78 that society tolerates the losses liabil-
ity may cause with regard to "innovation," but that "ideas and theories"
deserve greater protection is also puzzling. Product innovation surely
incorporates ideas and theories-enhanced or entirely new types of con-
sumer products are often derived from advances in science and technol-
ogy. If a particularly groundbreaking product must be recalled or never
reaches market because of the burden our product liability system has
placed on the manufacturer, consumers have necessarily been deprived
of the latest ideas and theories. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the
depiction of various types of mushrooms necessarily falls within the cat-
egory of ideas and theories that demand greater protection. The court
74 See Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035.
75 Id.
76 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
77 See Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to Publishers
of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. Riy. 603, 625 (2000).
78 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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provides no method for determining what information constitutes an idea
or theory worthy of heightened protection.
C. The Tangible-Intangible Distinction in Other Contexts
The tangibility concept articulated by the court in Winter has ex-
tended to products other than printed materials. In particular, courts have
begun to apply the tangible-intangible test to consumer electronic de-
vices containing a substantial informational component. Three contexts
where courts have already applied the tangibility test or where the test
will likely have a significant impact are video games, commercial GPS
devices, and computer software.79
Courts have readily applied the tangibility test in the context of
video games. In Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., for example, the court
was faced with the question of whether the content of a video game
could expose the game manufacturer to claims of strict products liabil-
ity.80 The plaintiff in Wilson argued that the video game Mortal Kombat
was defectively designed because the game made players feel as though
they were physically performing the acts of violence depicted in the
game.8' The plaintiff further argued that the game was "mentally-addic-
tive" and encouraged players to perform similar acts of violence in real
life. 82
In dismissing the plaintiffs products liability claims, the court in-
voked the tangible-intangible test and declared that "Mortal Kombat is
not sufficiently different in kind [from motion pictures or television pro-
grams] to fall outside the 'intangible' category that is demarcated in the
case law . . ."83 In essence, the threat of runaway liability in the context
of expressive media was too much for the court to tolerate. Other courts
addressing products liability claims in the context of video games have
reached similar conclusions. 84
The issue of defective information also potentially arises in the
growing field of commercial GPS devices.85 Although no court has
squarely addressed the issue, the tangible-intangible distinction may not
play a dispositive role in this context because such GPS devices are ar-
79 See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
80 See Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D. Conn. 2002).
81 See id. at 173.
82 See id.
83 Id. at 174.
84 See, e.g., Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1277-79 (D. Colo.
2002); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798, 810 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
85 See generally John E. Woodard, Oops, My GPS Made Me Do It!: GPS Manufacturer
Liability Under a Strict Products Liability Paradigm When GPS Fails to Give Accurate Direc-
tions to GPS End-Users, 34 U. DAYTON L. Riv. 429 (2009) (arguing that products liability is
the most appropriate cause of action for injuries due to faulty GPS directions).
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guably a sales-service hybrid.86 If courts are inclined, they may apply
existing rules governing transactions that consist of the sale of a product
combined with professional services and conclude that commercial GPS
services are more appropriately treated as services and therefore fall
outside the products liability system. 8 7 Even if, however, a court were to
determine that the product-like aspect of GPS devices predominates, it
appears likely, given the treatment of erroneous information in the con-
text of print media, that a court would nonetheless conclude that any
erroneous informational content delivered to a GPS device that ulti-
mately causes harm is separable from the physical GPS device itself and
is therefore not "tangible" enough to constitute a product.
Finally, potential liability stemming from computer software also
tests the tangible-intangible distinction.88 Although civil claims regard-
ing computer software have sometimes been brought under the Uniform
Commercial Code in the context of purely economic losses,89 Such
claims could instead be framed by using product liability terminology
when defective software results in personal injury.90 Those courts that
have determined whether computer software is a "good" under the Uni-
form Commercial Code have struggled to apply a tangible-intangible
distinction and have reached conflicting conclusions. 91 Such courts have
tended to focus on the service-like aspects of a software sale as compared
to the tangible aspects of the software medium. 92 Courts applying this
86 See id. at 445-52.
87 See, e.g., Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories, 32 Cal. App. 4th 248, 259 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that a commercial provider of white water rafting tours provided a service and
therefore could not be found liable as the lessor of a defective raft); Linden v. Cascade Stone
Co., 699 N.W.2d 189, 193-94 (Wis. 2005) (applying a "predominate purpose" test to conclude
that a contractor provided a product rather than a service).
88 See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
in dicta that "[c]omputer software that fails to yield the result for which it was designed may
be" an item subject to products liability). It is difficult to see how the Winter court could reach
this conclusion under its tangible-intangible approach. Computer software is more intangible
than the aeronautical charts at issue in that case.
89 See, e.g., Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 750 (Kan.
2006).
90 See Seldon J. Childers, Note, Don't Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for
Embedded Software, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & Pun. Po 'v 125, 140 (2008) (noting that there is very
little tort law regarding computer software); see also RiESTATEMENT (THIRD) oiF TORTs: PRoo-
ucrs LIAnIarry § 19 cmt. d (1998) ("When a court will have to decide whether to extend strict
liability to computer software, it may draw an analogy between the treatment of software
under the Uniform Commercial Code and under products liability law.").
91 Compare Wachter Mgmt. Co., 144 P.3d at 755 (finding that computer software consti-
tutes a good and not a service), with Data Processing Serv. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492
N.E.2d 314, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that a data processing system constituted a
service rather than a good).
92 See Data Processing Serv., 492 N.E.2d at 319 ("While a tangible end product, such as
floppy disks, hard disks, punch cards or magnetic tape used as a storage medium for the
program may be involved incidentally in this transaction, it is the skill and knowledge of the
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analysis generally consider software to be a service when the software in
question was developed specifically for a certain customer.93
These situations involving consumer electronic products illustrate
that as technology continues to progress, marketed information will play
an ever-increasing role in the lives of consumers. As more information
is sold in contexts that allow greater user interaction with the purchased
information, courts will be forced to address harms caused by defective
information with increasing frequency. Before approaching this task,
courts must address whether the tangible-intangible distinction is truly a
desirable method for determining the scope of products liability. The
muddled reasoning and conflicting results found in the decisions involv-
ing books, aeronautical charts, video games, and computer software
demonstrate that the tangible-intangible test cannot sufficiently allocate
information-derived liability. 9 4 Courts, therefore, should abandon the
tangibility concept as it is not conducive to consistent or intellectually
coherent results.
III. INFORMATION AS A PRODUCT: A BETTER METHOD
While the courts applying the tangible-intangible distinction are
often correct in identifying the relevant conflicting policy goals at is-
sue-the free market of ideas versus adequate risk spreading-they have
adopted the wrong conceptual approach to balance these policy issues.
In their attempt to determine whether information falls into the definition
of product, these courts have illogically severed the information at issue
from the physical media in which such information is presented. 95 This
is contrary not only to the commonsense notion of what constitutes a
product.
Consumers purchase both the informational content of a good as
well as any incidental physical media necessary for the transmission of
the information. For example, a buyer of a book supposedly containing
the complete works of Herman Melville but instead containing only
blank pages would certainly not be persuaded by the argument that any
writing was not part of the product she purchased. Under these circum-
stances, the value to the consumer rests not in the physical object pur-
chased, but in the words and ideas themselves. Although erroneous
information does not necessarily result in physical injury, and although
programmer which is being purchased in the main, not the devices by which this skill and
knowledge is placed into the buyer's computer. The means of transmission is not the essence
of the agreement.").
93 See, e.g., Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
94 See supra Part II.
95 See supra Part II.
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the definition of product is inherently malleable,96 the problem of defec-
tive information is not best served by twisting a legal definition beyond
recognition. Furthermore, there is no compelling justification for ignor-
ing the fact that information is a non-severable aspect of the product even
in those situations involving personal injury.
A. Information & Traditional Products Liability Doctrine
Because of their fixation on the threshold question of what consti-
tutes a product, courts addressing the issue of defective information have
failed to adequately consider other principles of products liability law. 9 7
Despite the sweeping language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts re-
garding strict liability, 98 it is clear that manufacturers are not absolutely
liable for any harm caused by their products.99 Rather, most courts have
recognized the concept of defect as the linchpin of products liability.'*
To succeed in a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a specific defec-
tive aspect of the defendant's product caused her harm. 01 Defects fall
into three categories: (1) manufacturing defects; (2) design defects; and
(3) warning defects.102
For classical manufacturing defects, proving defect is relatively
straightforward-the plaintiff merely needs to show that the product de-
viated from its intended design at the time it left the defendant's posses-
96 See KRAUSS, supra note 31, at 30-39; Cantu, supra note 2, at 637.
97 One exception to this is Aetna Casualty (discussed in Part IL.A of this Note) where the
court found an aeronautical chart to be a defective product because of the manufacturer's
choice of how the data was presented graphically. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen &
Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1981).
98 See RESTATEME-NT (SEcoND) o- TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965) ("This Section states a
special rule applicable to sellers of products. The rule is one of strict liability, making the
seller subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has exercised all possible care
in the preparation and sale of the product.").
99 See, e.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (111. 1980) ("Strict liability
is not the equivalent of absolute liability."). But see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The
First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 COR-
NELL L. REv. 129, 153 (1990) (arguing that manufacturers and distributors should be held
absolutely liable for all product caused harm).
100 See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 19, at 33. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF4
TORTs: PRODumcrs LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (imposing liability only for the sale of defective prod-
ucts); RESTATEMEiNr (THIRD) oF, ToRTs: PRoDucTs LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (defining the term
defect).
101 See, e.g., Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.
2005) (holding that the district court erred in not entering a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence show-
ing that an allegedly defective gyroscope more likely than not caused the helicopter crash at
issue); Midwestern V.W. Corp. v. Ringley, 503 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Ky. 1973) (noting that the
plaintiffs expert witness failed to explicitly state that the car accident at issue was probably
caused by the allegedly defective brake drum).
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF TORTs: PRoDucts LIABILrrY § 2 (1998).
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sion.I0 3 Liability for manufacturing defects is therefore strict in the
sense that the amount of care exercised by the defendant is irrelevant-a
defendant is liable not for employing inadequate quality control mea-
sures that allowed a defective product to arise, but rather for the act of
distributing the defective product itself.104
Claims grounded in the concept of defective design are more theo-
retically challenging. While in the case of manufacturing defects a prod-
uct can be compared to its intended design, when the design of the
product itself is questionable there is no readily available standard by
which to judge the product. 05 Instead, courts apply a variety of tests to
determine whether a product is defective in design. The most widely
accepted test is the risk-utility test. 106 Under this test, the plaintiff bears
the burden the demonstrating that a reasonable alternative design exists
which would have prevented her injury had the manufacturer adopted
that design.' 0 7 If the plaintiff is able to make this prima facie showing, a
jury must determine whether the manufacturer's failure to incorporate
the reasonable alternative design rendered the product not reasonably
safe and therefore defective. 08 In making this determination, the jury
looks at numerous factors, including the advantages and disadvantages of
the product as designed, the costs associated with incorporating the alter-
native design, the instructions and warnings accompanying the product,
103 See id. § 2(a) (imposing liability for manufacturing defect "when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product.").
104 See id. at cmt. c.
105 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Coitum. L. Rrv. 1531, 1540 (1973) (highlighting the
problem of polycentricity in design litigation, which limits the ability of courts to adjudicate
the design decisions of manufacturers because altering one facet of a product's design has
numerous implications for the product as a whole).
106 See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturer's Liability for Defec-
tive Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. Riv. 1061, 1073 (2009)
(surveying state law and finding that twenty-five states have adopted risk-utility balancing as
the sole method for determining design defect in products liability litigation). Those jurisdic-
tions yet to adopt risk-utility balancing employ some variation of the consumer expectations
test, which imposes liability based on the disappointment of consumer perceptions regarding
product safety. See Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. RIv. 1109,
1370 (1974) (articulating the basis for imposing liability based on reasonable consumer
expectations).
107 See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRoI)ucrs LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. d (1998) ("Under
prevailing rules concerning allocation of burden of proof, the plaintiff must prove that such a
reasonable alternative was, or reasonably could have been, available at time of sale or distribu-
tion."). But see Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (holding that
the manufacturer has the burden of proof in showing that the utility of the design outweighs its
dangers).
108 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROnucrs LIAnIIrrY § 2(b) (1998). But see
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Cal. 1972) (holding that a product may be
defectively designed even if its design does not render the product "unreasonably dangerous").
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any reasonable consumer expectations associated with the product, the
aesthetics of the product, and the effect the alternative design would have
on overall safety.'"
As many commentators have noted,o10 the risk-utility test for design
defect is theoretically similar to the common law concept of negli-
gence.III More importantly, numerous courts have refused to allow ju-
ries to consider the design choices of certain products and have instead
directed verdicts holding that those products are not unreasonably dan-
gerous as a matter of law.'1 2 In cases where courts have granted such
directed verdicts, important public policy considerations are at play, in-
cluding maintaining consumer choice within a market" 3 and avoiding a
categorical imposition of liability for certain products.1 4 These consid-
erations override the general principle that a jury determines whether a
product's design is unreasonably dangerous." 5
A product is also defective when a manufacturer fails to provide
reasonable instructions or warnings regarding the foreseeable risks of
harm associated with its product.' 16 Numerous factors may be consid-
ered when determining whether a particular warning was inadequate."' 7
As with design defects, failure-to-warn claims are theoretically similar to
the concept of negligence. IIs
Instead of approaching the issue of defective information from the
perspective of whether or not such information is a product, courts
should instead presume that all forms of commercially sold information
are products. Courts should then use the existing concept of duty to limit
109 See RESTATEMENr (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCIS LIAABILUfY § 2(a), cmt. f (1998)
(enumerating the factors that should be considered by the jury in determining design defect).
110 See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products
Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. Ruv. 874 (2002) (finding
that courts are increasingly questioning the validity of the distinction between strict liability
and negligence causes of action for design defect).
Ill Failure to adopt a reasonable alternative design is analogous to an untaken precaution
justifying liability under negligence. See David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L. REV.
291, 310-315 (2008).
112 See, e.g., Linegar v. Armour of Am., Inc., 909 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying
Missouri law); Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1999).
113 See Linegar, 909 F.2d at 1154-55 (holding that a contour-style bulletproof vest was
not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law despite the fact that other vests covering greater
portions of the torso were available on the market and were a viable reasonable alternative
design because it was questionable whether police officers would use the more protective but
also more physically restrictive vests); Scarangella, 717 N.E.2d at 679 (holding that a school
bus manufactured without an alarm activating when the bus shifted into reverse was not unrea-
sonably dangerous as a matter of law).
I 14 See Parish v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2006) (hold-
ing that a trampoline cannot be defectively designed simply by virtue of it being dangerous).
115 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
116 RESTATEMENI (THIRD) OF TORrs: PROIucrs LIAIIrrY § 2(c) (1998).
117 Id. at cmt. i.
118 Id.
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liability to those situations where it would best serve the policy goals of
products liability."' 9 Commentators who have called for a broader appli-
cation of products liability to commercial information have differing
views as to which particular theory such lawsuits should proceed
under. 120 This Note takes the position that regardless of which doctrinal
heading is applied to a particular lawsuit based on defective information,
the concept of duty remains a powerful tool for limiting the scope of
liability to those situations where it is justified by the policies underlying
the products liability system.121
B. A Duty-Based Approach
The recently adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Mental Harm provides that:
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable
care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical
harm.
(b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated counter-
vailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting
liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide
that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty
of reasonable care requires modification.12 2
These principles have played a significant role in the adjudication of
products liability claims. This is because duty issues arise in claims
brought under both defective design' 23 and failure-to-warn theories.124
Moreover, in numerous products liability cases, courts have engaged in
active pretrial policing of claims, using duty to cut off liability as a mat-
ter of law.125
The comments to § 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts provide a
variety of factors a court should consider in determining whether to limit
119 See supra Part I.
120 See Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for De-
fects in an Industry That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TE-cH. L.J.
745, 778-79 (2005) (arguing that software should be treated under design defect analysis);
Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for Defective Information in
Books, 77 OR. L. REv. 1195, 1211-14 (1998) (arguing that publisher liability for defective
information is best treated under failure to warn).
121 See supra Part 1.
122 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILI-Y FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOrIONAiL HARM
§ 7 (2010).
123 See Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in
Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 521, 526 (1982).
124 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. j (1998).
125 See notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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liability on the basis of duty.126 In determining whether a seller of defec-
tive information should be insulated from products liability suit on no-
duty grounds, courts should also consider several other factors that are
especially relevant in this context, including: (1) the First Amendment
principles regarding the free flow of ideas;127 (2) the technical nature of
many types of information that can invite reliance; and (3) the degree of
user input and delegated consumer responsibility.
As applied to defective information, the concept of duty is an enor-
mously powerful tool for shaping liability because it may be applied to
products on a categorical level. No-duty decisions allow courts to make
broad policy decisions that limit liability as a matter of law and ensure
that providers of certain products are not saddled with an unjustly bur-
densome duty to investigate the accuracy of the information sold. For
example, a publisher of a novel clearly should not have a duty to investi-
gate the accuracy of the information in the book because a novel is pri-
marily the fruit of the author's creativity. Similarly, products liability
claims against the producer of a video game should be dismissed on no-
duty grounds because of the expressive content of the game and the na-
ture of user interaction with the information contained therein.
These are just a few of the more salient examples of where liability
for commercially sold information is not justified. In most cases liability
for defective information will run against very strong policy goals such
as maintaining the free flow of ideas.128 By considering the particular
type of information at hand and applying the factors considered above,
courts will be able to allow suits to proceed where justified by public
policy and without having to torture the definition of product. This will
result in more transparent opinion writing, thereby allowing a plaintiff to
challenge a no-duty determination if the policy basis for that decision is
later shown to be flawed.129
C. Additional Tools for Shaping the Extent of Liability
Approaching the issue of defective information from a duty-based
perspective will not result in runaway liability or quell the free market of
ideas, as feared by the courts.o30 There are several principles of tort law
beyond the concept of duty that courts may use to adequately shape the
126 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY 17OR PHYSICAL AN) EMOTIONA.
HARM § 7 cmts. c-i (2010); see also Aaron D. Twerski, The Cleaver, the Violin, and the
Scalpel: Duty and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 60 HASTINas L.J. 1, 6 (2008) (arguing that
courts take into account many additional factors when making duty determinations).
127 See Noah, supra note 120, at 1218-22 (discussing the First Amendment implications
of liability for erroneously printed materials).
128 See id.
129 See Twerski, supra note 126, at 11.
130 See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991).
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extent of information-related liability. Courts may apply these principles
to appropriately balance the competing policy goals of the products lia-
bility system and the free market of ideas. Furthermore, these tools are
not radical judicial constructions, but rather ordinary legal concepts cur-
rently used to manage products liability litigation in non-information
contexts.
First, courts still have the ability to limit liability based on normal
principles of proximate cause. Product manufacturers are not liable for
all the harm their products cause in a strictly but-for sense. Rather, the
general tort principle of proximate cause is a necessary element to any
products liability claim.131 Proximate cause would be particularly rele-
vant in the context of defective information because words often carry
unknown consequences.13 2 As the Winter court noted, "words and ideas
have wings we cannot clip and which carry them we know not where." 33
Thus, the principle of proximate cause can serve as a powerful tool to
limit liability precisely because ideas carry unforeseen consequences.
Second, for many types of products, liability can still be limited
based on the general distinction between goods and services. This is the
method that courts have employed in computer software litigation and
could potentially adopt for commercial GPS devices.134 Although de-
claring that information is a service would in some contexts curb the
scope of liability, this approach essentially runs into the same line-draw-
ing problems the tangible-intangible distinction poses for determining
whether something is a product.135 As such, courts should first look to
other methods to limit liability before considering this approach.
CONCLUSION
This Note focused on how courts are addressing the issue of errone-
ous or defective information in products liability law. Courts con-
fronting this issue have generally chosen to deny liability as a matter of
law on the grounds that defective information is not tangible enough to
constitute a product.136 Fearful of the deleterious effect liability could
have on free expression, these courts have refused to allow defective
information claims to proceed.' 3 7 However, some courts have nonethe-
less recognized that defective information could result in viable products
liability claims in the context of aeronautical charts and computer
131 See RESTATFMENT (THIRD) oi TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 15 (1998).
132 See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 699-700 (6th Cir. 2002); Sanders v.
Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1276 (D. Colo. 2002).
133 Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035.
I34 See supra Part II.C.
I35 See supra Part II.
136 See id.
137 See id.
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software-a result that flies in the face of the tangible-intangible
distinction.138
Although commercially sold information poses significant issues for
the products liability system,139 the dilemma is not insurmountable. The
tangibility concept should be abandoned and courts should allow defec-
tive information cases to proceed under normal products liability theo-
ries. In most cases involving defective information, this will likely result
in a finding of no liability as a matter of law.
Products liability is an inherently policy-driven body of law, and
courts should trust in their ability to use the concept of duty to appropri-
ately limit the scope of liability in a manner that balances the goals of the
products liability system while maintaining the free exchange of ideas.
This will result in more transparent decision-making and better law.
138 See id.
I39 See id.
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